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2Abstract.
Traditional methods of cryptographic key distribution rest on judgments about an attacker.
With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) came proofs of security for the
mathematical models that define the protocols BB84 and B92; however, applying such proofs
to actual transmitting and receiving devices has been questioned.
Proofs of QKD security are propositions about models written in the mathematical
language of quantum mechanics, and the issue is the linking of such models to actual devices
in an experiment on security. To explore this issue, we adapt Wittgenstein’s method of
language games to view quantum language in its application to experimental activity involving
transmitting and receiving devices.
We sketch concepts with which to think about models in relation to experiments, without
assuming the experiments accord with any model; included is a concept of one quantum-
mechanical model enveloping another. For any model that agrees with given experimental
results and implies the security of a key, there is an enveloping model that agrees with the
same results while denying that security. As a result there is a gap between equations and the
behavior recorded from devices in an experiment, a gap bridged only by resort to something
beyond the reach of logic and measured data, well named by the word guesswork.
While this recognition of guesswork encourages eavesdropping, a related recognition of
guesswork in the design of feedback loops can help a transmitter and receiver to reduce their
vulnerability to eavesdropping.
31. Introduction
In a laboratory that has equations on a blackboard and devices† on a bench, a fair question
is how do the equations and the devices connect? The terms of the equations act as
words of a language used in the laboratory. People say or write these terms along with
non-mathematical words (e.g. ‘screwdriver’) while they work with devices, an activity
Wittgenstein characterized as a language game [1, 2, 3, 4]. Recently we brought the writing
of equations and the using of devices into a common language game. This allowed us to prove
that deciding to describe a particular laboratory situation by a particular quantum mechanical
model takes something beyond logic and measured data, something aptly called a guess [5].
Here are three examples of questions in quantum cryptography resolvable only by
augmenting equations and data by guesswork:
1. Alice and Bob interpret some equations as describing a transmitter and a receiver for
quantum-cryptographic key distribution. How do they make or buy devices that behave in
accord with those equations?
2. Bob uses quantum-electrodynamics to define photons in terms of creation operators,
and Bob’s photodiode detector feeds current blips into an audio amplifier so he hears and
counts them. Under what circumstances does counting blips give him a claim to say he counts
photons?
3. Alice and Bob experiment with a transmitter and a receiver linked by an optical fiber,
and their results agree with the predictions of a model in which it is proved they are secure
against undetected eavesdropping using individual attacks. What use can they make of that
proof?
We will show that quantum states are by no means ‘plainly visible’ in the devices of
† We think of ‘devices’ as being designed using quantum mechanics to serve practical purposes, and of
‘instruments’ as being used to test models in quantum mechanics. Often the same piece of gear can play either
role, and we shall use the word ‘device’ to mean either.
4experiments on quantum cryptography; rather there is a gap, as pictured in figure 1, between
states as terms in equations and results recorded from devices on a laboratory bench. To show
this gap and its bridging by guesswork, we will sketch a conceptual framework in section 2,
and then turn in section 3 to quantum cryptographic key distribution as an appealing arena for
examples. Cryptographers know that relying on a theory does not bind one’s enemy to rely
on the same theory. They know too that abstractions endemic to theories are likely targets
for cryptographic attack, so they can well imagine that a proof of the security of quantum
key distribution might not be the last word [6]. By seeing gaps in physics where logic cannot
reach and guesses are indispensable, we will see both limitations to proofs of the security of
quantum key distribution and opportunities to improve security.
2. Concepts for bridging equations and experiments
Preliminary to showing how guesses bridge the gap between equations and experiments, we
introduce the concept of a quantum mechanical model of an experimental trial; we also at-
tend to trial-to-trial management and introduce the envelopment of one model by another as
a building block for sections 3 and 4.
2.1. Models of experimental trials
Quantum mechanics provides language in which to write equations for various probabilities
and to relate these equations logically to one another. Proofs of QKD security apply equations
for probabilities as models of devices expected to be used to communicate keys. Quantum
mechanical operators and state vectors are germane to QKD security only as they appear as
components in equations that define probabilities in models that someone applies to actual or
anticipated devices.
To test a model of QKD one subjects the devices to a run of experimental trials, each
5of which involves setting up devices and recording results. In order that trials of devices can
test a model, the model must speak of the devices, and for this the operators and state vectors
must somehow be linked to these devices.
Appreciating the need to link state vectors to devices requires you to resist a temptation.
In planning a test of a model that involves quantum states, avoid picturing yourself ‘in a
Hilbert space of these states,’ an intangible world disconnected from the world of prisms
and fibers on a bench. Instead, look at how you can use quantum states in calculations.
Momentarily set aside the picture of state vectors as denizens of a Hilbert-space world, and
notice how you write characters for quantum states into a computer memory, preferably the
memory of the same computer that manages the devices during a run of experimental trials.
This puts your writing of quantum states and calculating with them into a common world with
the handling of prisms and fibers.
That still leaves the problem of how to attach state vectors and operators, as terms in
equations of a model, to devices in a laboratory. One goes half way by deciding to attach states
and operators as terms in equations to various settings of the knobs and levers by which the
devices are configured in a trial, to get state-valued functions and operator-valued functions
of the knob and lever settings [5]. To complete the attachment, one has to decide which
device settings go with which states and operators. Once accomplished, the attachment of the
states and operators to device settings converts the usual quantum mechanical probabilities of
outcomes for given states and operators to probabilities of outcomes for given device settings.
With this trick one gets equations interpreted as asserting something about devices. The first
kind of model to consider can be called a quantum-mechanical model of devices or, for short,
QM-model. Later we will use models of this type as a foundation on which to build some
other kinds of models.
A QM-model α consists of a triple of functions that, in combination, generate
probabilities of outcomes for various set-ups of devices. Simplifying the full description given
6in appendix A, one can view these functions as follows. (1) State preparation is expressed
by a function |stateα(set-up)〉 from the domain of set-ups of devices to state vectors; (2)
evolution over a time duration is expressed by a function Uα(set-up) from the domain of
set-ups of devices to unitary operators; and (3) a measurement process that generates results
is expressed by a function from set-ups of devices to operators, most generally in the form
of a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) as a set of detection operators, one for each
possible outcome, Mα,outcome(set-up) [7]. This triple of functions generates probabilities of
outcomes as a function of set-up, asserted by model α, according to the usual rule:
Prα(outcome|set-up)
= 〈stateα(set-up)|Uα(set-up)Mα,outcome(set-up)U †α(set-up)|stateα(set-up)〉,
(1)
where the subscripts α indicate that the functions to which they are attached are particular to
model α so another model would involve other functions.
Analyzing the receipt of a cryptographic key from the standpoint of quantum mechanics,
one is interested in the question the other way around. Given an outcome, Bob (or Eve) wants
to know what state Alice transmitted, a subject addressed by quantum decision theory via
Bayes rule [7, 8].
2.2. Computer management of trials and models
In order to describe the set-up of devices sufficiently to prove the need for guesswork in
choosing a model for QKD, we restrict ourselves to describing only a part of setting up
that can be controlled by a Classical digital Process-control Computer (CPC). This part is
described by the commands transmitted from the CPC to actuators internal to these devices.
Such commands call, for example, for a stepping motor to rotate a polarizer to a certain angle.
The same CPC serves to record the writing of QM-models in which set-ups are expressed
7as CPC-commands and to execute quantum-mechanical calculations involving these models.
(The proof of Proposition 1 in section 3 assumes only that some choices of set-up can be CPC
mediated, not that everything in setting up an experiment is CPC mediated.) As pictured in
figure 2, the CPC:
(1) provides an investigator with a display by which to experience results of trials
reported by the devices to the computer;
(2) gives the investigator a keyboard by which to operate the computer;
(3) makes a record of what the investigator does (such as entering equations into
programs that, when executed, control the devices); and
(4) (in various ways) allows feedback from the devices to modify the equations [5].
Section 3 presents examples in which devices are controlled jointly by Alice, Bob, and
Eve, each via a CPC; in this case a ‘command’ is taken to be the concatenation of commands
from the three CPCs of Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively.
2.3. Envelopment of one QM-model by another
In testing a QM-model against results of experimental trials, one tests the probability
distribution calculated from the model against relative frequencies extracted from measured
results.‡ Any such test of the probability distribution tests the triple of functions that
define the model, but only in the combination of equation (1); one cannot test any of the
functions separately without assuming the others. In particular, one cannot test quantum
states independently of the other two functions.§ When the probabilities of a model α are
found to closely match relative frequencies of outcomes for the various settings used in a run
‡ As discussed in [5], that extraction itself requires guesswork.
§ Claims that quantum tomography allows a scientist to determine a state experimentally [9, 10] assume that
the scientist knows the operators that describe the measuring instrument. But how does the scientist determine
these operators? By using the instruments to ‘measure known states’: without guesswork, the scientist is stuck
in a circle, as an example to come will show.
8of experimental trials of devices, one can still ask what other models agree as well with the
same relative frequencies.
To sharpen this question we define the first of two relations among QM-models. By
restricting the set of commands of a QM-model to a subset, one generates what can be called a
restriction of the QM-model. When an experiment confirms a QM-model, it actually confirms,
at most, the restriction of the QM-model to commands tested, and often these are a small
subset of the commands of the model. Suppose model α is such a restriction, and that it
generates probabilities that closely match the relative frequencies of a run of trials. Then
any model β agrees with the experimental trials if and only if it agrees with this model α.
Hence we want to know: what models other than model α predict the same probabilities as
does α concerning the settings covered by Cα? (Notice that this question is made possible
by the attachment of states and operators to settings of devices.) As we shall see, for any
QM-model α a large set of other QM-models, defined by a variety of triples of functions,
produce the same probabilities for settings of Cα. As a result, a tight screening of probability
distributions by experiments induces only a loose screening of state- and operator-valued
functions. This looseness in the testability of quantum states limits the role of proofs in
quantum cryptography.
To clarify this looseness we introduce the concept of an envelopment of one model by
another. Let Oα be the set of outcomes for model α. Given two QM-models α and β, suppose
there is a function f from a subset of Cβ × Oβ to Cα × Oα, with the property of preserving
probabilities in the sense that:
(∀ b ∈ Cα, j ∈ Oα) Prα(j|b) =
∑
(b′,j′)∈f−1(b,j)
Prβ(j
′|b′). (2)
We say such a function f envelops α by β. An enveloping model β need not preserve inner
products of quantum states of model α, and for this reason the inner products of quantum
states cannot be determined from experimental results without augmentation by guesswork.
9In the case to be discussed in section 3, there is no ‘mixing’ by the mapping f , which is to say
there exist functions g and h such that f(b, j) = (g(b), h(j)), and the envelopment of model
α by model β exhibits the provocative inequality:
|〈ψβ(b)|ψβ(b
′)〉| ≪ |〈ψα(g(b))|ψα(g(b
′))〉|, (3)
with implications for security shortly to be developed.
3. Application to quantum cryptography
For quantum key distribution using the protocols BB84 [11] or B92 [12], published arguments
for the security of the key [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] assume a QM-model α (augmented by
Bayes rule), according to which, at each trial, Alice’s transmitter receives a command bA
from some finite set of possible commands and ‘prepares a unit state vector’ |ψα(bA)〉. In
both early work that ignores noise and in later work that accounts for noise (and invokes
privacy amplification [15, 16, 18]), claims of security assume that inner products of the ‘unit
state vectors’ that Alice can transmit are experimentally verifiable without regard to what
devices Eve might invent. The argument is that, given suitable magnitudes of inner products
Sα(bA, b
′
A) ≡ |〈ψα(bA)|ψα(b
′
A)〉|, any snooping by Eve disturbs Alice’s states in ways Alice
and Bob can almost surely detect as an increase in the error rate in Bob’s reception or the rate
of inconclusive outcomes [19] or both (when they compare notes publicly, at the sacrifice of
some of the bits of the key).
To what extent can experimental results on devices confirm a model α that, based on
inner products, asserts security of QKD? Alice and Bob need to be secure not just against an
attack by snooping devices that they use when they play Eve’s part in Red-Blue exercises, but
against all of the attacks, within some class, that a real Eve might invent. Are Alice’s inner
products verifiably independent of Eve’s inventions?
To claim experimental confirmation of the security implied by inner products of model
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α is to claim that
a) the probabilities calculated from model α match closely the relative frequencies of
experimental results, and
b) no other QM-model (say one with smaller inner products) that challenges that security
produces the same probabilities that match those relative frequencies.
Although attachments of models of quantum cryptography to actual devices have been
questioned [15, 20], the possibility of enveloping a model α by a model β having smaller
inner products went unnoticed, with the consequence that the need to make the claim (b)—no
model with smaller inner products fits the experimental results—also went unnoticed.
The published arguments for security assume “any attack that Eve might invent” is
equivalent to “any QM-model that Eve might implement that has the inner products of model
α”. Thus the experimental confirmation of security depends on the notion that inner products
are experimentally testable. The trouble is that, as shown in section 2, experiments cannot test
states and their inner products per se but only the probabilities they generate. For example,
suppose a run of experimental trials shows a close match to the probabilities of a QM-model
α that speaks of certain inner products Sα(bA, b′A). Do these trials ‘demonstrate (e.g. single-
photon) states’ having these inner products? The answer is “no,” because for any model
α there is always an envelopment by an alternative model β that produces probabilities in
agreement with α concerning the experimental results that Alice and Bob have on hand,
but generates these probabilities on the basis of different states with smaller inner products.
Because of its smaller inner products, the model β points to something outside of model α
that, if Eve can do it, allows her to eavesdrop undetected.
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3.1. Example of conflicting models that fit the same measured data
Among widely used models of the security of quantum key distribution against undetected
individual attacks, there are two cases to consider, corresponding to Eve measuring Alice’s
signal directly, or, using a probe, indirectly. Deferring models of Eve’s use of a probe to
appendix B, we consider an individual eavesdropping attack in which Eve measures Alice’s
signal and tries to transmit a signal to Bob, aiming to match what would have come from
Alice. Any model α asserting security against this attack rests on an inner product for Alice’s
possible states. We now show how to envelop model α by a model β having a smaller inner
product but producing the same probabilities as model α.
The model α assumes that the command set Cα consists of concatenations of a command
bA from Alice to determine a state vector and a command bE from Eve to select a POVM.
These commands produce Alice’s state vector |vα(bA)〉 ∈ Hα, and Eve’s measurement
expressed by a POVM Mα(bE) which has a detection operator Mα(bE ; jE) acting on Hα,
associated with outcome jE . Model α implies that the conditional probability of Eve obtaining
the outcome jE given her command bE and Alice’s command bA is
Prα(jE|bA, bE) = 〈vα(bA)|Mα(bE ; jE)|vα(bA)〉, (4)
implying that the error rate for Eve in distinguishing among Alice’s commands, asserted by
model α, depends on the inner products Sα(bA|b′A).
Proposition 1 Given any such model α with inner products Sα(bA, b′A) and given any
0 ≤ r < 1, there is a model β that gives the same conditional probabilities of Eve’s outcomes
for all her commands belonging to Eα, so that
(∀ bA ∈ Aα, bE ∈ Eα) Prβ(jE |bA, bE) = Prα(jE |bA, bE) (5)
while
Sβ(bA, b
′
A) ≤ rSα(bA, b
′
A). (6)
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Proof: Motivated by the idea that, unknown to Alice, her transmitter signal might generate
an additional “leakage” into an unintended spurious channel that Eve reads, we construct the
following enveloping model β which assumes:
(i) the same set of commands for Alice,
(ii) a larger Hilbert space Hβ = Hleak ⊗ Hα in which Alice produces vectors |vβ(bA)〉 =
|wβ(bA)〉 ⊗ |vα(bA)〉, with |wβ(bA)〉 ∈ Hleak;
(iii) a larger set of commands for Eve, Eβ = Eα ⊔ Eextra (disjoint union);
(iv) a POVM-valued function of Eve’s commands to her measuring instruments, with
detection operators
Mβ(bE ; jE) =


1leak ⊗Mα(bE ; jE) for all bE ∈ Eα,
Eve’s choice of POVM to distinguish
|vβ(0)〉 from |vβ(1)〉 if bE ∈ Eextra.
(7)
According to model β, if Eve chooses any measurement command of Eα, equation (4) holds.
But model β speaks not of the vectors |vα(bA)〉 but of other vectors having an inner product
of magnitude
Sβ(bA, b
′
A)
def
= |〈vβ(bA)|vβ(b
′
A)〉|
= |〈w(bA)|w(b
′
A)〉||〈vα(bA)|vα(b
′
A)〉|. (8)
We can choose the unit vectors |w(bA)〉 at will; in particular nothing excludes choosing them
so that ∀ bA 6= b′A, |〈w(bA)|w(b′A)〉| ≤ r, from which the proposition follows. ✷
3.2. Impossibility of positive tests of inner products
Models of the form of model β with its r < 1 thus match any data that match model α
while denying security of the key. Given the two QM-models, α and β, that disagree about
cryptographic security while agreeing about probabilities for commands of Cα, one would
like to decide between the conflicting models by an experiment. But, without guesswork, this
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is impossible, for the enveloping model β is no description of instruments on hand; instead, it
is a picture of behavior that Eve might try to achieve by inventing a snooping device not yet
known. Nor does model β (nor any QM-model) say of itself how to implement it, because
it speaks only of states and operators rather than of the prisms and optical fibers that one
can find in a supply room. Implementing model β would require invention and discovery,
such as gaining access to a channel carrying leakage states [21, 22]. For this reason there
can be no positive experimental test of the inner products of quantum states, nor of claims
of cryptographic security based on such inner products. Indeed, to claim security against ‘all
the eavesdropping devices that Eve might invent’ for individual attacks is to misuse the word
‘all’; by confusing ‘all devices’ described by a model α with ‘all the models’ consistent with
experiments that accord with probabilities expressed by model α. It is for this reason that the
application of a model to actual devices takes guesswork. The notion that experiments can
determine Alice’s inner products independent of Eve’s inventions is faulty, because it confuses
experimental validation of probabilities, which is possible, with experimental validation of
inner products of quantum states, which, as we have shown, is impossible to disentangle from
guesswork.
In more practical terms, to experimentally confirm QKD security by ‘seeing a single-
photon state,’ one must see the absence of correlated signals that accompany it, which Eve
might receive, and nothing in Alice and Bob’s modeling and experiments can exclude a real
Eve from finding such a signal in a place Alice and Bob never thought to look, such as light
emitted by Alice’s transmitter in a spurious frequency band [15].
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4. Quantum physics between trials: a glimpse of feedback
It is often advantageous to introduce feedback into a run of trials, using the outcome of one
trial in setting up a next trial, as illustrated in figure 3 [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31].‖
By studying trial-to-trial adjustment brought about by feedback loops designed using QM-
models, we will win fresh insight into the bridging of equations and devices of experimental
trials. The typographical view of equation writing introduced in section 2, with CPCs as
equation holders, allows one to view a feedback loop as a special sort of device, a device
containing an equation-holding CPC which a scientist uses to link equations of QM-models
(and other equations) to operations of other devices. This picture opens up a place in
theoretical physics in which to investigate trial-to-trial adjustment.
To define a feedback loop, a designer specifies a control function that maps results of
completed trials and other records on hand to actions to be taken in response to these. The
specification of the control function can make use of QM-models. But neither a QM-model
nor a Schro¨dinger equation expresses a place in which an outcome from one trial can enter
to influence a state preparation at a subsequent trial; on the contrary, trial-to-trial adjustments
of devices take place in a space outside of QM-models, so to speak. To deal with feedback
in a quantum context, one has to implant QM-models as components of larger models, which
we call control models, which contain control functions that express how a CPC responds to
outcomes. Its need for feedback cements quantum physics into a classical environment of
CPCs that command the devices and record the results.
4.1. Comparisons of theory and experiment, in the presence of feedback
In a feedback situation, CPCs that accompany other devices or are embedded in them are part
of the experimental instrumentation, and so are their files housing the equations that define
‖ We do not discuss ‘coherent quantum feedback’ in the sense of ref. [32]
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a control function. These files of equations are used not for analysis but to define actions
of devices, which puts an end to any categorical distinction between equations and devices.
This poses a question of just what one compares with what in an experimental trial, for one
cannot, in this situation, compare an ‘equation as something unphysical’ against ‘behavior of
physical devices free of equations’. One does, however, compare predictions calculated from
a QM-model and other equations of a control model with experimental trials in which the
same equations take part in programs of CPCs that control the devices. I.e., one compares a
‘use of equations and guesses to make a prediction’ against ‘behavior of devices controlled
by CPCs programmed using the same equations’ (and possibly other equations as well).
4.2. Timing in quantum cryptography
Quantum cryptography provides an arena for examples of trial-to-trial adjustments, pertaining
to timing. In quantum key distribution, Bob’s receiver is intended to detect a sequence of
signals transmitted by Alice. Bob’s receiver (as well as Eve’s snooping devices) depends on
keeping in step with the signals of the sequence transmitted by Alice. Besides the need to
correlate detections with Alice’s acts of transmission, there can be a need to gate a receiver
off except in a narrow time interval around the arrival of each signal.
Keeping the receiver in step with the signals arriving from the transmitter requires
one or another use of results of one trial to regulate the receiver timing for another trial.
That is synchronization, an important form of trial-to-trial adjustment. For understanding
synchronization, it is necessary to look for a quantum description of reception that describes
a receiver only imperfectly timed. This leads us to the notion of a receiver that measures,
or at least estimates, the time difference between the arrival of a signal and the gating of its
detector, a time difference we call skew. For a quantum-mechanical model to express this
additional distinction of temporal skew in detection, it has to allow for a larger variety of
quantum states than did models α and β above, with the skew as an additional argument,
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which entails expanding the dimension of the Hilbert space beyond that of model α.
To glimpse an expanded model γ that envelops the model α of section 3, and that allows
a designer to picture timing, suppose a receiver is designed to expect the k-th signal at reading
tk of its clock, and that the clock is fast by a skew sk; then the signal arrives not at clock
reading tk but in a small interval around tk − sk. To allow for skew, model γ must have a
Hilbert space Hγ , of dimension higher than that of Hα (if that is finite), along with states
|vγ(bA, sk)〉 that are functions not only of Alice’s commands in Aγ = Aα, but also of the skew
sk of Bob’s clock. We conclude that for model α to accord with the behavior of an imperfectly
synchronized receiver, there must be an envelopment f of model α by such a model γ with
the property that:
(∀ −s0 < sk < s0) f(|vγ(bA, sk)〉) = |vα(bA)〉. (9)
An interesting topic for future work is the elaboration of models such as γ and their
application to more subtle forms of synchronization, with which Alice and Bob can advance
their cause by making it more difficult for Eve to make guesses necessary to eavesdropping.
For example if Alice and Bob manage to synchronize of Bob’s receiver while Alice transmits
using a deliberately irregular clock rate, Eve has a problem determining when to gate her
snooping receiver.
5. Discussion
To base QKD security only on proofs is to forget the crucial point that proofs are purely
mathematical. A proof of a proposition asserting security shows that the proposition, written
as an equation, follows from assumptions by logic, without guesswork. Prominent in the
assumptions are inner products. In simple and rough terms, a proof of QKD security shows
that if Alice’s transmitter is modeled by a certain inner product between two possible states,
then the model says: ‘any individual eavesdropping attack is detectable.’ But do we buy the
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assumption on which the conclusion of the model rests? Can one decide this by applying logic
to experimental tests of the model? More precisely, suppose relative frequencies of outcomes
obtained in a run of experimental trials agree with the probabilities calculated from the inner
products assumed in the model: do we then buy the model?
We have tried to avoid garbling logical connections within mathematics, on one hand,
with the application of that mathematics to actual devices on the other. By analyzing not
just a single model but a multiplicity of models (all purely mathematical) we made plain a
security issue: for any experimental data on hand, more than one model can fit them perfectly,
and among the models that fit the data are models with widely differing inner products. Thus
choosing one of these models while rejecting others requires reaching outside the measured
data and the logic of models, as asserted by our Proposition 1. Because inner products,
central to QKD security, vary widely over those models that exactly fit the measured data, the
measured data cannot determine the value of the inner product. Therefore the inner product
is not measurable, and assuming that any model, with its inner products, applies to particular
devices reaches beyond logic into the realm of guesswork.
Like any proof, our proof of Proposition 1 clarifies the effect of rules of logic. This proof
escapes the question “are we sensible to apply it to cryptography” because we do not apply
it to devices per se, but use it only to elucidate the logic of arguments about cryptography,
arguments that, as it turns out, overlook choices of model that are apparent once the model
that asserts security has been set in the context of a language game in which it competes with
other models.
The world of cryptography, as we have described it, is a multi-model world in which each
side must guess to choose models that guide actions. By recognizing feedback, as in section
4, we show choices of models, with their guesswork, that enter responses to experimental
results, and hence enter the use of outcomes to manage experiments. Records in the memory
of a computer used in a feedback loop can reflect guesses within a structure of equations and
18
devices. By introducing CPCs, with their capacity to mediate between a scientist and devices
and to record guesses as choices of models used in device-controlling programs, we make a
beginning toward exploring the structure of guesswork in the bridging of equations to devices.
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Appendix A. Formal definition of QM-models and their envelopment
To formally present QM-models and the enveloping of one by another, it is convenient to
introduce a category having structures of equations of QM-models as its objects [33]. We
abuse language by calling these structures QM-models. Any QM-model α consists of: a
domain Cα of commands from CPCs (which we interpret as commands that set up devices),
a set of possible outcomes Oα, a Hilbert space Hα, and a triple of functions, namely (1)
|ψα〉 : Cα × Oα → Hα, (2) Uα : Cα × Oα → {unitary operators on Hα}, and (3)
Mα : Cα × Oα → {semipositive hermitian operators on Hα}, subject to the constraint that
makes Mα work as a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM), namely that
(∀ b ∈ Cα)
∑
j∈Oα
M(b; j) = 1, (A.1)
where the 1 denotes the identity operator on Hα. The triple of functions defines a probability
distribution on outcomes given the set-up b ∈ Cα by the rule
Prα(j|b) = 〈ψα(b; j)|U
†
α(b; j)Mα(b; j)Uα(b; j)|ψα(b; j)〉. (A.2)
In the examples in the paper, the state preparation expressed by |ψα〉 depends only on a
command and not on an outcome, as does the unitary transform Uα; in that case equation
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(A.1) becomes
Prα(j|b) = 〈ψα(b)|U
†
α(b)Mα(b; j)Uα(b)|ψα(b)〉. (A.3)
We remark that if the devices are controlled by more than one CPC, as is the case in
cryptographic examples, then the command b that specifies a set-up of devices is a composite
of commands from the various CPCs. For example if the set-up is established by the three
CPCs of Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively, a command b has the form b = bA ‖ bB ‖ bE
where ‖ denotes concatenation of the commands from the three parties.
The single set Cα × Oα, which expresses the possibilities of set-ups of devices for a run
of trials along with the possible outcomes, is the domain for all three functions that represent
state preparation, evolution, and measurement. Sometimes one wants to suppose that one
device prepares a state, another device is responsible for evolution, and a third measures.
By adding assumptions beyond those by which we defined a QM-model, one can generate
a specialization of a QM-model that expresses such a notion, as if the function |ψα〉 had a
domain distinct from that of Uα andMα. For example, one can specialize a QM-model so that
the state |ψα(b, j)〉 depends only on bA and not on the commands bB and bE (concatenated
with it to form b ∈ Cα), nor on the outcome j in Oα. A function |ψ′α(bA)〉 can always be
written as a function |ψα〉 on Cα × Oα for which variation of the argument j in Oα makes
no change in the value of the function, and similarly, variation in the bE and bB parts of b
make no change; for this reason, we can (and do) look at a function |ψ′α(bE)〉 of one variable
as a special case of the function |ψα(b, j)〉 of two variables. A reason to formulate all three
functions with the more general domain Cα × Oα is that, as discussed in [5], the supposition
that one device prepares a state independent of other devices is unprovable; it is introducible
only as an additional assumption. In addition, including the Oα factor in the domain of |ψ〉
allows the modeling of randomness in state preparation.
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Given two models α and β of the category, a morphism from β to α is defined by a
function f from a subset (not necessarily proper) of Cβ × Oβ to Cα × Oα, with the property
of preserving probabilities in the sense that:
(∀ b ∈ Cα, j ∈ Oα) Prα(j|b) =
∑
(b′,j′)∈f−1(b,j)
Prβ(j
′|b′). (A.4)
Given such a morphism, QM-model β will be said to envelop QM-model α, and the
morphism will be called an envelopment. When the morphism f is such that there are
command-outcome pairs in Cβ × Oβ having positive probabilities but no image under f in
Cα×Oα, model α is a special case of model β with respect to the probabilities it predicts (but
not necessarily with respect to its internal structure of inner products).
In some cases, an envelopment f from a model β to a given model α preserves inner
products in the sense that |〈ψα(f(b; j))|ψα(f(b′; j′))〉| = |〈ψβ(b; j)|ψβ(b′; j′)〉|. For most of
the envelopments, however, this is not the case. It is a mistake in logic to confuse the property
of envelopment with the special case of envelopment that preserves inner products.
An application of envelopment is the finding, demonstrated in section 3, that a model
β can envelop a model α without preserving inner products. In the case discussed in that
section, there is no ‘mixing’ by f , which is to say there exist functions g and h such that
f(b, j) = (g(b), h(j)), and the envelopment of model α by model β exhibits the provocative
inequality:
|〈ψβ(b)|ψβ(b
′)〉| 6= |〈ψα(g(b))|ψα(g(b
′))〉|, (A.5)
which allows for security expressed by a model α to be contradicted by an enveloping model
β.
Appendix B. Security models involving a probe and a defense function
Arguments for the security of quantum key distribution that deal with noisy channels call for
privacy amplification to distill a secure key [18]. These arguments center on a defense function
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[15, 16, 19, 34]. Defense functions have been analyzed for models embellished to speak of
Eve’s use of a probe [14]. In such a model α, Alice chooses one of several state vectors in one
Hilbert space Hsig,α while Eve generates a fixed vector in a different Hilbert space Hprobe,α,
and the tensor product of Alice’s choice of state vector and Eve’s fixed probe vector evolves
unitarily in an interaction, after which Eve and Bob make measurements, Eve confined to the
probe sector and Bob to the signal sector.
To see the consequence of signal leakage for defense functions and probes, suppose that
Alice and Bob use model α which assumes that Alice chooses between state vectors |vα(0)〉
and |vα(1)〉 with inner product having a magnitude Sα = |〈vα(1)|vα(0)〉|. Assuming model
α, Alice and Bob determine a defense function t(n, eT ), as discussed in [16]; in order to mark
its dependence on model α and especially its dependence on the inner product of Sα, we write
this as tα(n, eT , Sα). As in the simpler case of section 3, if the inner products for distinct
signal vectors are all zero, Eve can learn everything without causing any effect that Alice and
Bob can detect; and, as before, Alice’s state vectors are model-dependent, and so are their
inner products. For this reason, it is easy to adapt the reasoning of Proposition 1 to prove:
Proposition 2 If a model α asserts that Alice and Bob can distill a key that is secure against
measurements commanded by Eve from a set of commandsEα, then there exists another model
β that matches the predictions of model α for the commands in Eα but, by virtue of different
inner products, makes additional commands available to Eve that make the key insecure.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Gap between analyzing with models and using devices
Figure 2. Models and devices reflected in files of CPC
Figure 3. CPC-controlled adjustment in response to outcomes
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Figure 1. Gap between analyzing with models and using devices.
C
P
C Command
Result
Transmitter/
Receiver
CPC Memory
Model α:
|Uα〉,  
  |Vα〉
Figure 2.
Adjustable
Local
Oscillator
DetectorMix
Photon
CPC
Figure 3. CPC-controlled adjustment in response to outcomes.
